[jrp]

Most GA aircraft are single crew. Pre-takeoff, in flight and pre-landing checks are just down to the pilot.
In aircraft requiring more than one crew member I think there is a "challenge and response" system for checks.

How did that evolve?

[Dave W]

Here's some history.

There are some fascinating research articles around, too. Here's one of the more readable ones, from NASA.

[Capt Edmund]

Japanese railways have found out that verbalising checks and next actions is also beneficial for single person ops. They now point to signals, state colour, and then say stop or carry on. Apparently that activity helps to overcome confirmation bias of seeing what you expect to see. That's why I will say 3 greens out loud whilst pointing at the lights!

[Dave W]

It's "shisa kanko" ("pointing and calling") - it's come up in discussion here before, a while ago now. Fascinating to see when you don't know what they're doing (and then also when you do!)

I've tried to implement it in the cockpit myself - I wouldn't claim that my discipline with it is yet all that it could be, though.

[PaulSS]

The Japanese are also incredible creatures of habit and do things just because they need to be done. I've seen an airside van driver pull up short of a 'T' junction, point right (whilst hissing to show great effort in pointing), point left, point right again, drive forward 1m to the junction, repeat the same actions and then drive straight into the baggage trolleys being towed in front of him The important thing to him is he did the pointing (and hissing) because that is what he must do.

We were told the pointing increases your chance of noticing something by 70% but this was by Japanese, so I'm not entirely convinced

12 years based in Japan has seen some 'interesting' things, especially with a mixed challenge and response checklist, where you have to remember where you have to chime in. Even more interesting is combining that with a 787 electronic checklist

[T6Harvard]

As a student doing my pre flight checklist, second lesson, instructor told me to actually touch the switches rather than just look at them, as I confirm on / off or correct position.

With any crucial action, aviation or otherwise, I tend to say it out loud to emphasise to myself.

The only time I have been upfront with retractable uc I was along for the ride but take it from me, I made jolly sure the requisite number of lights were shining at the right time.

Avoiding complacency using different methods fascinates and scares me.

[Trent772]

Our ex lot used to proscribe the flight control checks in a certain manner.

I always used to randomise it.

Some F/O's would say - you're not doing it in the correct order - I would simply say - say what you see, not what you expect !

The incident in Portugal with reversed controls a couple of years ago - had they used random control checks, they may have picked up the reversed controls.

We used to have a simple A4 two sided laminated check list that was basic Airbus. Then the Managerettes decided that was no longer good enough and insisted we used electronic check lists on the useless HP tablet running buggy Wind*ws 8 that kept crashing. So, as you taxied out, you had to leave the taxi plate to go onto another page that opened up a checklist during one of the critical phases....... Thankfully, it was still printed in the Quick Ref Handbook, which I used and kept the taxi plate up

So glad I am retired......

[Rob L]

...

The incident in Portugal with reversed controls a couple of years ago - had they used random control checks, they may have picked up the reversed controls....

Which incident?
Rob

[Trent772]

https://aviation-safety.net/database/re ... 20181111-0

[patowalker]

Wow! That is a long list of failings.

[Bill McCarthy]

The submarine propulsion and reactor pre startup check procedures take 12 blokes about 10 hours to complete and they definitely don’t sing out what they are doing. The critical rod position ( the rod position that you expect the reactor to go critical)takes two blokes a further two or three hours to calculate using a whole host of past data. Calculators not allowed lest they go wrong or a corrupted in some way. Any mistakes found in the startup process - it’s all done again.

[Dominie]

https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20181111-0

As an engineer, it galls me to say that, counter-intuitively, the most important time to check everything VERY carefully before flight is immediately AFTER it has just been serviced/repaired!

The RAF had a Shackleton (poss in the 1980s) which had cross connected elevator cables on Major. This was missed pre-flight - it took off from Lossiemouth and made an immediate safe landing at Kinloss.

[kanga]

Our ex lot used to proscribe the flight control checks in a certain manner.

..

might have been safer to prescribe them ?

[kanga]

..
As an engineer, it galls me to say that, counter-intuitively, the most important time to check everything VERY carefully before flight is immediately AFTER it has just been serviced/repaired!

The RAF had a Shackleton (poss in the 1980s) which had cross connected elevator cables on Major. This was missed pre-flight - it took off from Lossiemouth and made an immediate safe landing at Kinloss.

Another incident on first flight after major service (at Kinloss), with non-fatal ditching and lost airframe:

https://aviation-safety.net/database/re ... 19950516-0

[alexbrett2]

It sounds like it would be boring, but I found https://www.amazon.co.uk/Checklist-Mani ... 1846683149 a fascinating read - it's by a surgeon who talks about how checklists were introduced into surgical procedures, but covers a bit of aviation background among other things in terms of inspiration for them...