[Iceman]

I posted the AAIB link to the Cirrus accident above. A subsequent search did find the aircraft but I don’t recall the body ever been found (there were even conspiracy theories of him having jumped from the aircraft over land pre-crash when Police released photos stating ‘have you seen this man’ at the time).

Iceman

[matthew_w100]

So do we have even a glimmer of what actually happened? Radio calls? Radar plots? PLB? Not many people cross the Channel in a Warrior without talking to someone.

[A4 Pacific]

matthew_w100 wrote:
> So do we have even a glimmer of what actually happened? Radio calls?
> Radar plots? PLB? Not many people cross the Channel in a Warrior without
> talking to someone.

Depends what altitude they are at I guess? I get the impression these guys may have descended due, what has apparently been described as ‘freak’ weather. Whatever that is.

Not that it would have made much difference, due icing, but we’re they current on instruments?

It was clearly a bad situation, recognised by those who reportedly diverted around the weather, or turned back.

[Ibra]

matthew_w100 wrote:
> So do we have even a glimmer of what actually happened? Radio calls?
> Radar plots? PLB? Not many people cross the Channel in a Warrior without
> talking to someone.

My understanding they were handed over to French FIS before SAR was triggered (they were 25nm of Lydd and 10nm from LeTouquet), surely Lille has full radar traces (FR24 & FA are probably truncated or not reliable), London would have some feeds as well

If it was loss of control in nasty cloud, it’s unlikely there was any radio, mayday or PLB

[Highland Park]

Report issued by AAIB:

https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aaib-sp ... 0-2-g-egva

[Dave W]

That's so sad. Even more so since the report (towards the bottom of p2) indicates that there was an autopilot available.

Although tragically not relevant in this instance, the observation about the seatbelts being fastened *under* the lifejackets (and therefore being a significant hazard for emergency egress on land or water) is worth noting.

[Rob P]

...the seatbelts being fastened *under* the lifejackets (and therefore being a significant hazard for emergency egress on land or water) is ...

... bizarre.

What were they thinking?

Rob P

[malcolmfrost]

With the rates of climb seen I doubt any autopilot would have made a difference.

[GAFlyer4Fun]

...the seatbelts being fastened *under* the lifejackets (and therefore being a significant hazard for emergency egress on land or water) is ...

... bizarre.

What were they thinking?

Rob P

I wonder if the AAIB attempted to look at historic video from these pilots previous flights across the Channel to see if this was a one-off arrangement of seatbelts with a lifejacket.

[Dave W]

The AAIB report notes that this arrangement is suggestive of putting the lifejackets on after securing the 3-point straps.

It doesn't say it, but to me that implies they donned the jackets in flight. I doubt, therefore, that they considered emergency egress at all.

[pullup]

Is it possible to put on a life jacket properly if you are already strapped in? I didn’t think so....

[Ibra]

The report point that the aircraft was limited between FL75 & 1500ft amsl

While I understand LTMA constraint is a tough call (VFR from Golf, they will be dead by the time they get cleared into LTMA, sad but true), I never expected “prohibited or dangerous” in Golf from 0ft-1500ft to be a “hard constraint”? don’t London Info offer DACS/DAIS on these area? having a piece of “restricted airspace” down to surface is just nuts and poor design for VFR, I could see the huge treat to safety for many VFR cross English Channel when that piece of airspace is operated like CTR down to the ground without an aerodrome in charge…

Two questions,

- Before they get into clouds, why they did not fly laterally to stay VMC? maybe fear of long water crossing (risk of engine failure is tiny and besides a controlled ditching is very survivable and can be mitigated by rafts & jackets)

- While inside bumpy clouds, why they did not descend to safe altitude or even sea surface to become VMC? maybe fear of busting danger area (personally, I would have zero hesitation to do so in case of emergency: engine failure, icing, convective encounter…you have to descend into any sort of airspace bellow your wings, like it or not)

There is a lesson here: an old golden rule, never fly VFR in position where dealing with weather would require pop-up clearance or permission into airspace

There are other lessons: never fly in clouds is not qualified and if you do 180deg turn but airspace design along the shortest crossing is also a major issue? there were 6 aircraft: the twin under IFR, 4 aircraft flew VFR in convective IMC to L2K (one went into DA), one aircraft turned back to Shoreham (proper 180), the last aircraft got stuck looking for VMC between LTMA & DA


This is unlikely other to be an isolated event and many may follow as having 1500ft-3000ft English Channel Danger Area sitting in the shortest water crossing without "published VFR route SFC-FL75" is a disaster for airspace design: it would simply push many aircraft to fly into cloud or fly long crossing, the latter, is the safest option, the former, require instrument ratings & equipments

[patowalker]

Is it possible to put on a life jacket properly if you are already strapped in? I didn’t think so....

I don't think it is. How would you get the back strap of the lifejacked under the shoulderstrap of the seatbelt? It seems to me that they must have donned the lifejackets before tacking their seats, then slipped the seatbelt shoulder strap under the jacket, before attaching it and closing the buckle. Not a good arrangement, but certainly not as bad as it reads in the report.

[Dave W]

I think it is potentially very bad. The loads on the strap and jacket could result in an extremely dangerous snagging hazard if there is water on the cockpit bouying the occupant up - jacket uninflated, that will still occur to a degree.

Even worse would be if the aircraft was inverted.

My view is that it's at best dangerous and at worst an insurmountable obstruction to escape.

One positive lesson from this tragedy would be if people consciously check in the future that they haven't (deliberately or inadvertently) done this.

[patowalker]

I agree it is very bad, but it is not as bad as fitting the jackets after being strapped or taking off without them on. Underestimating the difficulty of releasing a shoulder strap, is quite different to making the seatbelt buckle inaccessible, in my view. I just think the pilots deserve a bit more credit than they are given on here and in the report.