Primarily for general aviation discussion, but other aviation topics are also welcome.
#1656081
Dave W wrote:Are instructors being "bashed" on this thread? I don't see it.

FTAOD I was not seeking to bash instructors in general or to criticise, with 20/20 hindsight, those involved in these particular incidents.

I was wondering

- whether other people also get this irrational feeling
- how ready I, and other students, would be to refuse to fly with an instructor if there was something about it we didn't like
#1656082
I found this comment rather disconcerting....

Witnesses reported that the instructor appeared concerned about the conditions for the flight to Gloucester. He gave them the impression that he was unhappy with the plan but there is no evidence that he raised any such concerns with the higher management of the flying school.
#1656084
Gertie wrote:FTAOD I was not seeking to bash instructors in general
I think you raised a good point. I don't think I fly as well as normal when I have an instructor on board. I don't know why I cede so much control, and don't think as critically as I do when I'm absolutely in charge.
It's worrying because, if I can't show the guy the real me, how can he help me get better?
#1656095
The Chief Flying Instructor is responsible for the quality and content of the training delivered to the students of that school.

All instructors need some leadership and oversight from time to time.
Keep an eye on what they are doing, as well as their health and moods!

Know your own situation too.
I made some mistakes this morning, and I am aware of them. It puts an alert on my own progress today even though I am not flying.

So I usually brief the student to let me know if they do not like anything about the flight.
It is CRM training from the start.
I have had many students tell me they were concerned about something during a flight, but because they were with me they felt it must be alright!
Wrong idea.

Egos are dangerous in flying, and we are notorious for having huge egos easily dented when we’re criticised, or we have an accident in spite of having thousands of hours.
Some instructors are beyond question, they’re perfect.

So students should be taught to question, and instructors need to control their frustration from time to time when his/her procedure is questioned. Everything should be able to be justified with reason.

I test student sometimes, fly into weather I do not like myself and hope they question this decision.
I won't continue beyond my own risk limit, (never put the aeroplane into a seriously risky situation), but I hope the student questions it much sooner.
Debrief the decision making afterwards.
#1656099
As a new pilot, I have to make a conscious effort to prevent myself slipping into this.

I really don’t know what it is that triggers/fosters the feeling, but I noticed during the latter parts of my ab initio training that when I was flying P.ut rather than p1 my decision making and reaction to situations were delayed - almost as though my brain was awaiting confirmation from my instructor.

On one occasion this was enough to cause a fairly firm landing which shook my confidence a little - only over the following days did I piece together quite how it's had happened that I controlled the aeroplane (or rather didn’t) in the way that I did.

I have also noticed traces of the habit creeping in when flying with more experienced pilots - so continue to evaluate my decisions post flight to monitor my human failings.

As someone stated above - it may be part of the learning experience to trust no-one but yourself with the decisions required as PIC.
#1656104
I think that the whole issue of cockpit psychology vis-a-vis the FI and student is a complex one and impossible to distil down into a sound-bite or two. It seems to me that as FIs we need to be constantly cogniscent of our own fallibility and of the potentially adverse effects of that psychological environment in the cockpit. As students we need to also to be constantly aware that we are learning to become captains of aeroplanes (not just pilots of aeroplanes, if you see my point) and that the skills of decision-making and judgement are indivisible from captaincy. Somehow within that there needs to be created an environment in which both parties learn. It's not easy, though - for either party.
#1656110
David Wood wrote:I think that the whole issue of cockpit psychology vis-a-vis the FI and student is a complex one and impossible to distil down into a sound-bite or two. It seems to me that as FIs we need to be constantly cogniscent of our own fallibility and of the potentially adverse effects of that psychological environment in the cockpit. As students we need to also to be constantly aware that we are learning to become captains of aeroplanes (not just pilots of aeroplanes, if you see my point) and that the skills of decision-making and judgement are indivisible from captaincy. Somehow within that there needs to be created an environment in which both parties learn. It's not easy, though - for either party.


In both cases in this month's AAIB report there was a catastrophal failure of captaincy - recklessly negligent.
#1656120
Flyin'Dutch' wrote:In both cases in this month's AAIB report there was a catastrophal failure of captaincy - recklessly negligent.


Strong words :shock: Is that really the case? If we are going to have a just culture and properly start to tackle Human Factors issues , I don't think statements like that are a starting point. Very, very few accidents and incidents are negligence as opposed to HF root causes. Substitution test is always interesting - would others have done the same? If it is the incident I think you are talking about, well then others did.
#1656124
Instructing and testing someone in an aeroplane you have never flown and which is in a class you have no entitlement to is setting out from the beginning as something that you are not qualified for.

Launching into weather which is not suitable for VFR in accordance with the rules or common sense, knowing that the weather is such and that you and/or the aeroplane are not suited to do the flight in IFR conditions is similarly negligent.

These are very strong words - but people have died as a result of these people making these decisions.

I am pretty sure your view would pretty soon align with mine if it was something similar in my field of work.

This is not a view expressed at the starting point - it is the view formed based on what we know, read the AAIB report.

In aviation it is time we start to look at the facts and stop deluding ourselves we are somehow special; the behaviours by our fellow non-aviator humans is just as prevalent in aviation and where that leads to fatal accidents it needs to be dealt with appropriately.

Accidents and incidents need to be investigated as they are and lessons learned, but we need to deal with the outcome appropriately, not shirking the responsibilities we have as a community to our fellow aviators, our families and the wider society.
#1656132
Flyin'Dutch' wrote:Instructing and testing someone in an aeroplane you have never flown and which is in a class you have no entitlement to is setting out from the beginning as something that you are not qualified for.

Launching into weather which is not suitable for VFR in accordance with the rules an common sense, knowing that the weather is such and that you and/or the aeroplane are not suited to do the flight in IFR conditions is similarly negligent.



How do you know he didn't believe he was qualified in accordance with his SEP rating?

The weather was fit in accordance with UK VFR rules.

Negligence requires willful and deliberate ignorance of rules/procedures/practices. Even then, in HF terms if the ignorance of rules is driven by organisational pressures or for organisational gain (as opposed to individual gain) it wouldn't fall that far beyond the culpability line into negligence.
#1656141
@Balliol

WAVS - I am not sure how you can execute a VFR flight on that route (COV-GLS) with a cloud base between 1000 and 800ft in accordance with the rules taking into account the 500ft rule - and whilst it may be legal to plan such strictly looking, a route given the circumstances it has nothing to do with common sense, especially given the geography and resulting orographic features resulting from this.

FMKA - maybe not unreasonable for someone with

The instructor was a former military fast jet pilot and a current commercial airline pilot. His total flying experience amounted to approximately 18,200 hours.

to either know the rules or where they are going to do something knew, to look at the rules, rather than make assumptions.

Doing stalls at the height the AAIB believe they were doing them is not in accordance with common practise or common sense.

In both cases there will have been a very large authority gradient in the cockpit.
#1656154
I don't believe 'negligence' is independent of Human Factors, surely negligence is a, or at least is integral to Human Factors.

How many times has this route been flown in similar circumstances without incident and therefore not made the headlines, just like the other aircraft that left at the same time? A Human Factor, I'd argue, that reinforces the belief it can be done safely, is that it has been done many times in less than ideal conditons.

Human Factors being what they are it is inevitable such flights will continue to be flown.

For me accusations of being recklessly negligent with dismissal of the Human Factors that lead to the light taking place is too strong for this particular case.

If the accident crew were negligent does it follow the other crew were equally negligent?
#1656158
Miscellaneous wrote:If the accident crew were negligent does it follow the other crew were equally negligent?


Technically not because there was no harm.....
#1656186
I am far less qualified than many on this thread to make further comment on causes and lessons on these 2 tragedies, but:

a. flying only in summers and often from different bases/schools/clubs, in '60s and '70s I regularly had very young (A)FIs with (B)CPLs and IMCRs who were clearly only hour-building towards hopes of an airline job. Some were good, some less so (as instructors, as perceived by me)

b. I was at an Air Cadet Camp at a FJ Station, with AEF Chipmunks deployed in which Station pilots could volunteer to fly to supplement the AEF regulars. The grizzled old AEF QFI failed several very experienced (and in 2 cases very Senior) current FJ pilots in their Chipmunk checkouts, refusing to let them fly Cadets. Similarly, an experienced recently ex-Lightning pilot was flying Chipmunks at our local AEF, but was permanently grounded by the OC for rolling too low over the airfield with a Cadet on board (not requested by the Cadet, I later gathered)

c. on the day and not long after the Cotswolds tragedy, I had to drive into the nearby hills not far from its site, ironically to give a talk on an aspect of aviation history. I had to drive very slowly on foglights all the way, taking at least twice as long as the journey would usually take in good weather.