FLYER Club Member
Sun Jun 04, 2017 8:57 pm
#1539039
Notwithstanding its widespread adoption, publication on Skydemon is not a prerequisite for the introduction of an airspace change.
I agree. But it wasn't on the half million either. Hence my point that it was inadequately publicised to be a real trial.
I’m surprised at your contention that pilots/aircrew that don’t effectively check NOTAMs for relevant information with respect to the safe operation of their flight is an acceptable way to operate.
Nowhere did I contend that it was acceptable. But if you want to look at the world as it is, rather than how we would like it to be, you might discover that this happens. Add to this the rather poor NOTAM system and you can see the problem.
Not being an LSA licensed ATCO, but cognisant of the traffic flows and routings in the area (especially the potential for procedural conflictions for releases against LCY departures), I challenge your contention:
Not my contention. FASVIG's contention. And they looked quite hard into it.
Once again, the debate dissolves into the fallacious argument that Class D CAS is a ‘no go’ zone to GA aircraft. It’s not.
I come at this from a gliding perspective. And class D is pretty much no go to gliders, especially without transponders, as most of them are. Whether you like it or not, the effect of class D is that gliders largely go elsewhere, for good reason. And we have good data to demonstrate this. For the rest of GA, less so, but still a good number of GA pilots route around rather than ask for a clearance which might be refused. All this creates choke points, and increased risk.
Obviously, Exeter are attempting to improve safety standards - which they have an obligation to pursue - for the operation for which they are responsible.
Yes, I understand this. And therein lies my point about and RMZ being an improvement, and the response to...
Therefore, an (expensive) D check on an aircraft doesn’t need to be done at the time specified in the regulations because we all know that there is large safety factor built into the system and “I can get MOST of the safety benefit by unilaterally increasing the TBO until I see fit…..”
Additionally, I’m intrigued at the concept of ‘some IFR approaches are more equal than others.’
It's about risk.
Clearly it's an acceptable risk for CAT to fly in Class G, and for IFR traffic to be OCAS. Otherwise we wouldn't let it happen. But there are ways of reducing risk that don't involve going to an extreme (particularly when that extreme increases risk elsewhere). I'll give you a couple of examples.
I don't buy your D check analogy. It's not what I'm saying. What I'm saying is that the maintenance regime that you would use for a 747 is not the same as you'd use for a Turbulent. EASA went too far towards the first idea and are now (fortunately) backing away from it. Similarly in medical standards. And in pilot licensing.
The high regulatory standards built into equipment in certified aircraft mustn't be eroded, by your argument. But they are costly, and when portable navigation equipment (moving map) came on the scene (which didn't need certification, and so were low cost), GA controlled flight into terrain accidents in the US reduced dramatically. The regulation had been costing lives, not saving them.
And similarly in the Exeter case. Risk isn't a black and white thing.
You can improve the situation by, for example a RMZ. You'd know more about the traffic. Sure, if you lose the radar the workload is higher, but you can still find out where any other traffic is, and decide whether to make the approach, or wait till it's clear, or ask them to move. Presumably, if you keep your radar well maintained, this won't happen very often.
Similarly, you don't need large blocks of airspace to allow every type of aircraft to do every sort of approach. Perhaps you take the view that at a minor regional airport if you want an approach that's in protected airspace you do one specific one - maybe a GPS one, or a DME arc from out at sea.
But actually most of the Exeter document isn't about risk. It's about improving efficiencies. And (rather like the Farnborough example) it's about improving the efficiency of their traffic, whilst causing problems to others.
And my point about MATZs was to suggest a MATZ sized piece of CAS as a possibility. Just as an example.
That would certainly protect the final approach track. So let's do a bit of airspace design. Let's have that MATZ (it's pretty much their CTR, plus the stub to the east and an equivalent to the west. And let's leave them the entry to the airway to the south. So now they can get everything in and out of the airways in CAS, but they lose all the proposed airspace to the north. I still don't like it, but it's better.
And don't knock the idea. I know that the controllers in the regional airport close to where I fly would like something of that size if they were to have CAS (which fortunately they don't because of the next point). My gliding club have implemented what we call a Radio Advisory Zone of about that size with them - so they get a call when one of our gliders goes in. Works well, makes their life much easier. I think it also helps that almost all of our cross country gliders carry Flarm and they can (unofficially) see that.
Bottom line - we don't need to design airspace at a small regional airport as if it had the traffic flows of Gatwick or Heathrow. And that's what we're doing.
Paul
ChrisRowland, rohmer liked this
