Primarily for general aviation discussion, but other aviation topics are also welcome.
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By Josh
#1392190
I read the conclusions, but don't really know enough about how high performance flight testing works to analyse how they were working. It doesn't really put the accident into the context of their test campaign particularly.

The newspapers trumpeting "pilot error" are as useless as ever, and the NTSB analysis is OK, but not much more than that.
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By Dave W
FLYER Club Member  FLYER Club Member
#1392214
I agree. The accompanying Probable Cause report, when it is published - which presumably won't be long now they've had a public presentation - will be more helpful.

On the face of it, the FAA don't come out of this too well. :(
By daysleeper
#1392249
It's about as organisationally damning a probable cause statement as I've seen in a long time from the NTSB. The public docket is an eye-opener.

http://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/PR20150728.aspx

The Board found that Scaled Composites failed to consider the possibility that a test pilot could unlock the feather early or that this single-point human error could cause the feather to deploy uncommanded. The Board also found that Scaled Composites failed to ensure that test pilots adequately understood the risks of unlocking the feather early. Investigators found that the only documented discussion with the accident pilots about the loads on the feather as the vehicle transitioned from subsonic to supersonic flight occurred more than 3 years before the accident.

The FAA was responsible for evaluating Scaled Composites’ experimental permit applications for test flights of the vehicle. After granting an initial permit and renewing the permit once, the FAA recognized that Scaled Composites’ hazard analysis did not meet the software and human error requirements in FAA regulations for experimental permits. The FAA then waived the hazard analysis requirements related to software and human errors based on mitigations included in Scaled Composites’ experimental permit application; however, the FAA subsequently failed to ensure the mitigations in the waiver were being implemented by Scaled.

NTSB Chairman Christopher A. Hart emphasized that consideration of human factors, which was not emphasized in the design, safety assessment, and operation of SpaceShipTwo’s feather system, is critical to safe manned spaceflight to mitigate the potential consequences of human error.
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By Gertie
#1392253
But unless one of the items documented to be tested on this flight by the test pilots was "see what happens if you pull the handle early" why would a test pilot depart from the test schedule and pull handles that they weren't supposed to be pulling?

At the absolute least, wouldn't departing from the test schedule invalidate whatever they were supposed to be testing, and waste a very expensive launch?
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By Josh
#1392263
That conclusion is devoid of context. Did they not address it because they felt their control measures were adequate and it hadn't been a problem thus far? Was the workload for the crew reasonable? What other issues were they concerned about prior to the test?

There was an exceptional NTSB report covering the fatal accident to a G650 prototype during takeoff certification testing that covered all these sorts of areas in great depth which is why I find this so disappointing.
By daysleeper
#1392290
But unless one of the items documented to be tested on this flight by the test pilots was "see what happens if you pull the handle early" why would a test pilot depart from the test schedule and pull handles that they weren't supposed to be pulling?

and
That conclusion is devoid of context


There is a wealth of public docket info while we await the NTSB's final report but reading the factual and this is my interpretation of it... Scaled did not apply the last 100 years or so of HF learning, everything from font size on displays to crew vibration levels was how they felt it should be rather than the validated aviation industry standards. Chairman Hart said
For commercial spaceflight to successfully mature, we must meticulously seek out and mitigate known hazards, as a prerequisite to identifying and mitigating new hazards

What he seems to have meant was they got the simple stuff so badly wrong that they crashed before the complex even became an issue.